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
CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE: ARMY RC (RESERVE COMPONENTS)
CHALLENGE FOR THE 1990'S(U) ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE
BARRACKS PA R D STACY 04 APR 88


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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE: Army RC Challenge for the 1990s

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Stacy

Colonel Robert A. Holden, FA
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
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4 April 1988

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INTRODUCTION

It is time to put the genie back into the bottle. With the Intermediate (theater) Nuclear Force (INF) treaty, and more nuclear disarmament treaties presumably to follow, we are hoping to reduce the possibility of a nuclear holocaust. Part of the price for this reduction is the loss of nuclear weapons as the primary deterrent means.

Deterrence at the strategic level is coming back around to what we now call "conventional deterrence," to which many believe we should have been paying more attention all along. An effective conventional deterrent capability shows resolve to a potential aggressor regardless of whether that aggressor uses or even has nuclear weapons. This credible conventional deterrent capability then, is the other part of the price of reduction of reliance on nuclear power.

In this paper, I will state that we are moving appropriately from reliance on nuclear deterrence to reliance on conventional deterrence. I will also make the point that a credible conventional deterrence requires a viable Reserve Component (RC) and show that though the RC's capability has improved markedly, it is still not wholly viable in that deterrence role. I will then examine some things that need to be done to make the RC more viable.

The format of the paper follows the U.S. Army War College's national security strategy model: Ends (objectives), Ways (concepts), and Means (resources). "Ends" includes definitions and the threat to be deterred. "Ways" deals with nuclear and conventional deterrence as well as RC and mobilization preparedness. The "Means" portion discusses the need for support from the people, the Army, and the Congress.

ENDS

The "end" for which we prepare is to deter aggression against us or any of our interests. For too many years we have concentrated our alliances, force planning, and deterrent strategy on the "two extreme threats" of a Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe and Soviet massive strategic nuclear attack. Much of the rest of the world that has heretofore been dependent on our military influence has felt justifiably neglected and some have turned away.

Defense and Deterrence Defined

In popular writing, in speeches, and sometimes in academic literature there is confusion between defense and deterrence. While defense can be used in a generic sense regarding anything having to do with arms and doctrine, as a strategic term it is specific. The applicable dictionary definition of defense is the "capability of resisting attack."⁴ Whether passive, as in barricades, or active, as in mines armed and troops on alert, the purpose of a defensive strategy is to restrain an aggressor at the point of aggression or to regain lost territory.

Deterrence is not as easy to define as is defense. Yet, "if we bet our lives on deterrence, we would be well advised to have a fairly clear notion as to how it works."⁵ The Library of Congress' definition of deterrence is quite mild: "Measures to discourage or restrain an enemy from using his military forces."⁶ We in the military tend to think of it as the act of "persuading the [party to be] deterred that his own interest compels him to desist from committing a certain act." It irrevocably commits the deterring party to exact

from the party to be deterred an overwhelming "price" should the act be performed; a price "so high that it would clearly override any gain." Deterrence, then, is a defensive posture that promises an immediate and very strong offensive reaction which would be punitive to some degree."

An analysis of the main ingredients of deterrent policies reveals that they are intended to work through application of fear, rational assessments of costs and gains, uncertainty and risk, or any combination of the three.' Regardless of the way we intend for it to work, deterrence depends on credibility since "we cannot dissuade an attacker if he believes we are not willing as well as able to fight back."⁹ In addition to our credibility, we must take into account the vulnerability of the potential adversary,"¹⁰ since that determines how much deterrent force we need to have available.

FM 100-5, "Operations" says, "The overriding mission of US forces is to deter war,"¹¹ and we do that by making aggression a "no-win situation."¹² According to the Army Chief of Staff, GEN Carl Vuono, warfighting must be our focus because "preparing for battle" is the "key to deterrence."¹³ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ADM William Crowe, says that deterrent strategy requires us to "maintain military capabilities throughout the spectrum of potential conflict."¹⁴

The very success of a deterrent posture gives rise to its vulnerability to criticism. It is as intangible as an insurance policy. Premiums are constantly paid, but tangible benefits are never seen. If deterrence works, no one can prove it; if it fails, everyone knows.

Whom Do We Need To Deter?

Fred Ikle and The Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy said, "... we will always need to deter the extreme contingencies. But it does not take much nuclear force to destroy a civil society. We need to devote our predominant effort to a wide range of more plausible, important contingencies." To be credible to deter an aggressor, we need to be prepared to deal with any threat from him.

WAYS

Nuclear

In our nuclear infancy, we could logically rely on nuclear power to serve as a deterrent (at least until the Korean War) because of uncertainty as to how much provocation we would take before retaliating with an "A-Bomb." That uncertainty was not just on the part of any potential aggressors, we as well did not know what we would do; however, our youth has passed and we must have a more sophisticated outlook. I believe the mature view is nuclear strength deters nuclear attack, but it takes conventional strength to deter conventional attack. It is more credible to believe we would retaliate with nuclear weapons against nuclear attack than against conventional attack.

It is too early to be able to fully evaluate the impact of the INF treaty, let alone START, etc, but we must begin the process. What is certain is nuclear reductions signal our conventional forces and possibly SDI as having to carry "the burden of preserving peace and deterring aggression." GEN Vuono says the existence of arms control agreements "heightens the need to redress the

conventional imbalance of forces in established theaters."¹⁷ Because of these two factors, the Army's Reserve Components will be more critical than ever in their complementary role and they "... will stand ready to take their place in filling the conventional force structure shortage . . . ," but there is a price to pay.¹⁸ More about resources when we look at "means." Suffice it to say here that maintaining conventional forces is more expensive than maintaining doubt about whether and how we might employ nuclear force.

Conventional

In 1979, Roger Speed looked at possible strategies for the future and came to the conclusion our conventional response strategy had no deterrent credibility with either the Soviets or with our allies.¹⁹ Our equipment, doctrine, manpower, and training were all suspect. We spoke softly, but we were not carrying a very "big stick," at least not conventionally. Now we have the M-1 Abrams Tank, M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, B-1 Bomber, etc., and generally a stronger military than we did eight years ago, but "if our military forces are not prepared to fight, then few of our adversaries will be deterred from committing hostile acts against us or our interests."²⁰ We should not be surprised that little has been written about "conventional deterrence." It is a relatively new term since for over 40 years we have depended upon our nuclear arsenal to protect us. One author on the subject tells us deterrence is largely a matter of strategy²¹, and another tells us any statements we make about strategy for deterring or fighting aggression must "fit together" to be credible.²² If we sound unsure of ourselves, it is a safe bet we are.

As mentioned earlier, successful deterrence is hard to quantify. After all, how do we know it was not something besides military preparedness or patriotic fervor that deterred aggression? "We have a very poor understanding of how our force structure is perceived by potential adversaries and how it affects their decisions." It would be interesting to compare what order of importance potential adversaries place on our overall force structure, immediate reaction forces, special operations forces, reinforcements for forward deployed units, and sea/air lift. While such a comparison is beyond the scope of this study, we can look at the sufficiency of our conventional power.

Considering the condition of our conventional forces, Fred Ikle's committee recommended to the Secretary of Defense that any consideration of conventional arms reductions must have an agreement that is not only verifiable, but also must be "backed by an industrial mobilization capacity and the political will to respond effectively in the event the agreement breaks down."⁴ The logical extension of the commission's report is that we cannot reduce active U.S. conventional forces without the assurance of allied, reserve, and industrial capability.

Regarding conventional deterrence, the Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci, told the U.S. Senate during his confirmation hearings that with the INF and budget problems, the U.S. will have to become "more creative" (in other words, "do more with less") in NATO conventional defense. He also said he expects "force structure to be a big political debate" as changes have to be made.⁵ Force structure involves, in part, the mix between AC and RC forces.

Reaffirming that the purpose of the forces in Europe is deterrence, GEN Jack Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) said his forces have

to be "ready to fight and defend successfully against any attack." He adds, since there is "no evidence that the Soviets have modified their goals and objectives," we must keep paying for deterrence because if it fails, "the price will be far higher than we would ever wish to bear." The forces available to him for his deterrence mission in Europe are both AC and RC.

Strong conventional land force capability is the essential ingredient for credibility and the Army's conventional capability is divided almost equally between its two components, the Active (AC) and the Reserve (RC). The Reserve Component consists of the United States Army Reserve (USAR) and the Army National Guard (ARNG) with both units and individual members (Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING)).

Mobilization and the RC

For FY86, the breakout of readily deployable (active duty or selected reserve) personnel between the Army's components was 51% AC and 49% RC (29% ARNG and 20% USAR). The total personnel (including IRR and ING) was 42% AC and 58% RC. JCS Publication 21, "Mobilization," shows the RC unit contribution to the Army's force structure as 70% of the Combat Support, 75% of the Combat Service Support, and 50% of the Combat Arms units. JCS Pub 21 says, "The mobilization of individual or units of the reserve is the quickest, most orderly, and, in some cases, the only way to correct force structure shortfalls as well as deficiencies of active units." With this much reliance on the RC, it is appropriate to be concerned with their capability to go to war. After all, AC units have 365 days a year to train while RC units have only 38.

There is frequently confusion between the terms capability and readiness. To avoid the same confusion here, we should note readiness is a component of capability, which includes force structure (composition, organization, manpower, and systems), modernization (equipment), sustainability (ammunition, spare parts, supplies, and the mobilization base), and readiness (ability to perform missions promptly).¹⁴ The term preparedness is usually used to mean the condition of our forces capability.

Our perceived lack of mobilization preparedness stems from many things, not the least of which is doctrine. "Short war" doctrine held that any conventional war would be high intensity and short duration where everybody who was involved would just do it on a "come as you are" basis. A more realistic view is that we do not know what to expect and we should simply "be ready for anything."¹⁵ To do that with our current force structure mix of AC and RC requires a very flexible mobilization capability.

Regarding the RC part of the force structure, James Webb, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, testified to a Senate committee that the RC is nearly saturated with missions. He said the Army RC units have grown faster than equipment and training can catch up to them.¹⁶

Rand Corporation's James Lacy (former Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) says the U.S. has made a shift to "reliance on mobilization as opposed to readiness" with "remarkably little public discussion." He says by the early 1990s we will rely more on the RC than "any time since the initial months of the Korean War" and unless the RC does its job well, "the overall [mobilization] scheme cannot be executed." Lacy observes "... few combat contingencies anywhere in the world,

. . . can any longer be met adequately, for more than a few days or weeks, without an early reserve activation," and "we depend more on part-time and inactive reserves to do what they have never done before."

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) reported to the Secretary of Defense that because mobilization day can occur any time, "it would be too late to begin readiness preparations." The RFPB said the bright part is the ". . . RC experienced an increase in overall capability and readiness in FY86."

In an article for the Reserve Officers Association, ADM Crowe told of a book written 20 years ago by then MAJ Jack Galvin (now SACEUR). In his book, *The Minutemen*, MAJ Galvin said the minutemen of the Revolutionary War were "hardly the ragged, transient rabble of farmers and woodsmen" we think. He suggested we should eliminate "the old myths about effortless and instantaneous mobilization of national strength for defense."⁴ His point was that the minutemen were representative of a tough, trained, patriotic people prepared to fulfill their missions. We need the same mentality today.

In the past, calling in the RC was the next to last resort after the AC could not get the job done and before declaring general mobilization with a massive draft, etc. The RC was perceived to be a club of guys who helped out in floods and earthquakes, using Army surplus equipment left over from the last war. RC training was "weekends and summer camp." Many Americans, including senior officers and politicians are surprised to find out that is the way it used to be. They think that is the way it still is!

Norman Friedman says, "A serious reserve program keeps . . . [a] sense of unity alive, and also maintains national awareness of the need for armed vigilance, itself an important unifying force." However, he goes on to say,

"Army reserves . . . do not make an important difference unless they are available in great numbers."

"Total Force Policy" is the official name given to the nation's reliance on both the active and reserve components of the armed forces. The policy was originally articulated as a concept by former Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird in 1970. His successor, James Schlesinger made the concept a policy in 1973. According to Air Force COL James Gould of the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, "The policy's basic tenet is that the Guard and Reserve provide the primary augmentation asset for expanding the active component in a military emergency." He says the policy expects these reservists to be "fully trained, adequately equipped, and combat-ready." The Total Force Policy, then, is the RC and the AC in partnership for "detering war, providing defense, and waging war should hostilities occur."

In his book on the Army Reserve, *Twice the Citizen*, LTC Richard Crossland tells us the Total Force Policy was born in campaign promises by Richard Nixon, growing out of the country's desire for draft reform and the candidate's goal of an all-volunteer military. In 1972, Army Chief of Staff GEN William Westmoreland, greatly concerned about the ability of the RC, saw the proposed new policy as a requirement for an organized and structured reliance on the Army's RC and directed Army planning to emphasize RC integration. While the shift to Total Force was primarily political and financial, the Army attempted to make the shift with foresight.

Total Force Policy acknowledges: The U.S. is militarily dependent on the RC (the country "cannot successfully mount sustained military operations without employing the Guard and Reserve"); the RC is cost-effective (less expensive);

the RC provides continuity (not rotated as much, in-depth expertise in one type unit/staff, corporate memory, local community, strong identity with unit and people); and the RC needs to be integrated with the AC more than has historically been the case."

In the Army, the division of labor between the AC and RC was not done simply as a reaction to the Total Force Policy. In 1973, Army Chief of Staff GEN Creighton Abrams and Secretary of Defense Laird instituted a plan to rearrange the Army so no administration, even with congressional agreement, could commit U.S. Army troops to sustained conflict without the RC and, therefore, the will of the people. Much of the Army's capability was placed in the Army National Guard (primarily combat arms) and the U.S. Army Reserve (primarily combat support and combat service support)."

This was an appropriate return to the constitutional intent. Though our standing Army is larger than our founding fathers could have imagined, so is the country, the number of people, and the scope of vital interests. Regardless of the size of the standing army, it cannot go to war without the will of the people which is implied in mobilizing the RC. Noted military writer Martin van Creveld says, "Logistics make up as much as nine tenths of the business of war." Couple that with the fact that 75% of our Army logistics capability is in the RC and you have a very sobering reality. We cannot execute a major OPLAN without the RC.

A very highly placed defense official recently told the Army War College class, "Our adversaries know well that putting our forces on alert means very little because we cannot go far or do much without the RC."

Many things have changed since the writing of the Constitution, but we still rely on civilian control of the military and have returned to reliance on the citizen-soldier. We are now returning to reliance on the RC for deterrence of potential aggressors, rather than just defense.

In review, there are some very worthwhile advantages to giving more missions to the RC: It protects the military from executive misuse, provides an opportunity (requirement) for developing the National Will, is less expensive, augments the AC, increases the spirit of partnership inherent in the Total Force Policy, provides motivation for mobilization preparedness, and supports the All Volunteer Force. There is also a significant disadvantage in giving more missions to the RC, the program must be fully supported with money, strategic lift, equipment, training, and all of the other things that go along with adequate preparedness.

RC Preparedness

Evaluations of the ability of the RC to fulfill its role as a deterring force are naturally mixed, from those who believe the citizen-soldier should never be relied on to those who believe the RC is already doing its share of deterring.

In a recent *Parameters* article, one of the pessimists concerned about the RC's ability, LTC A.J. Bacevich, suggests there are six Army "myths" which need to be replaced. Two of these myths are directly relevant to this discussion: First, the Army's mission is deterrence; Second, Citizen-Soldiers are good and necessary. Bacevich says the new myth to replace deterrence as the Army mission is "Warfighting." Nuclear weapons may deter in this age, but soldiers

do not, they fight. He recommends replacing the citizen-soldier myth with one that calls for regular "professionals" only. "However enthusiastic the Army's leadership, the Congress during peacetime . . . [will] not pay for a citizen's army, and the American people . . . [will] not support it with their sons." He says, "In practice, the citizen-soldier [remains] no readier for war than . . . his counterpart in the 19th Century militia."*-

It is not too difficult for a reservist to get a glimpse from the pessimist's viewpoint. All he would have to do is imagine someone who was programmed to do a civilian job just like his, but rarely had the opportunity to practice for it. For example, assume the civilian job is radio station news director and that in case of a national emergency a radio station would be set up in the next town. There, an old transmitter is warmed up once in a while, and the person designated to be the news director leaves her job as a laboratory technician once a month to practice reading old newspapers into a tape recorder. She also goes to another town's station each year and spends two weeks working with the news director. No matter how good she may be, or how much the mayor likes her, it is difficult to imagine she can do the job even half as well as the full-time "professional" news director who has spent years developing contacts and a local perspective. In fact, the full-timer would likely be offended by the suggestion that she was just as qualified as he. More to the relevant point, how convinced would her potential listeners be?

After pondering whether the RC "as currently configured" represents an acceptable risk, James Lacy concludes that it does not. In fact they ". . . have become the single greatest choke-point in U.S. military preparedness." He

suggests that our historical experience with the RC has been "scarcely reassuring."⁴³

GEN Galvin says his available support units in NATO are undermanned and the RC units which are to help out in the theater are similarly understrength and underequipped.⁴⁴

In their book, *America's First Battles*, editors LTC Charles Heller and BG William Stofft examine ten situations where the Army fought for the first time in each war. Several of these first battles involved RC units who fared no better (usually worse) than their AC counterparts. In the final chapter, historian John Shy concludes we and our enemies have made a mistake in the past by not taking seriously our poorly trained, poorly equipped citizen-soldier, because he has proven to be quick to learn, even from error and loss. Shy predicts, however, ". . . soldiers in the next first battle will never get the chance to adapt once the first shots have been fired."⁴⁵

ADM Crowe portrays the more optimistic view when he says, Total Force integration "has developed our RC into one of the world's truly formidable military forces." He pulls no punches when he says, "We are betting that in a major war we can expand our peacetime military establishment . . . so that we will ultimately prevail." He adds the caution that "this is an appropriate policy for a democracy, but it leaves little room for day-to-day miscalculation." ADM Crowe sees the broad scope of the community unifying force of involved, integrated reservists who, "as activist patriots, work to solidify important roots of support among the public for strong defenses."⁴⁶

"The RC ground, sea, and air forces of the U.S. are more prepared for mobilization and more ready for combat than at any other time of peace in the

history of our nation."⁴⁷ Those encouraging words are from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Stephen Duncan. Last year, during his confirmation hearings, Mr Duncan told the Senate Armed Services Committee his primary focus would be on the "combat readiness of the Guard and Reserve" because "the importance of Reserve readiness to the credible deterrence of war and to the winning of war if deterrence fails, has never been greater."

"The deterrent value of U.S. Reserve Components is predicated on their combat power, readiness, and ability to mobilize and be deployed to influence the early stages of a conflict," according to JCS Pub 21. It goes on to say, "To be effective, the deterrent value must be clearly evident to a potential enemy."

One might well ask whether we have any evidence to cause us to believe our potential adversaries take into account our conventional capability or our RC readiness. Is it logical that they should? Does it really make any difference in this nuclear world? Probably the best answer is to note we pay close attention to theirs. When we evaluate the strength of any likely foe, we look at their industrial base, their national will, and their reserve power and readiness.

Given that potential aggressors consider our RC readiness in their own threat assessments, we should be aware of how convincing we are to ourselves. Our national resolve must be based on the confidence placed in us by the National Command Authority; Congress; Department of the Army; sister services; warfighting CinCs; higher, counterpart, and subordinate units; our allies; and the citizens of the country. A healthy introspection will give us a good clue

as to how our foes view us. Based on the views shown previously in this paper, it is apparent that we have mixed reviews.

Part of the reason for the mixed reviews is that in this nuclear world some have apparently lost sight of the value of conventional warfare, mobilization, and the RC as deterrent vehicles. Mobilization preparedness is a valuable "political signaling" means which "can enhance deterrence and improve the credibility of national security policy."⁵⁰

There is an important caution to be considered here. Steps taken to mobilize the national industrial base and reserve capabilities could actually precipitate hostilities if done in an exaggerated and uncontrolled fashion out of proportion to the threat. However, well-ordered, organized steps increasing the mobilization preparedness of our RC will signal resolve and assist deterrence.⁵¹

MEANS

The People

Perhaps the greatest deterrent we have is the spectre of an angry American public. We love our freedom and our peace. If anyone deliberately makes a tangible move to threaten it, they know there will be hell to pay. This is what we mean by showing national resolve. What better way to prove our resolve than to support a strong reserve component?

The Army

There are some Total Force realities the Army's leadership should keep in mind: Both the AC and the RC are competing for the same resources; Separation between the components is lessening and must continue to do so; America is "high tech", and the RC provides an excellent means for helping to bring the technology into the Army; industrial preparedness and its effect on sustainability is becoming "increasingly recognized as a fundamental component of deterrence and military power."

We need to strive for a significant qualitative edge in personnel and equipment in the AC. We also need to "diversify and strengthen our ability to . . . provide our conventional forces with more selective and more effective capabilities for destroying military targets."

According to ADM Crowe, rapid mobilization of the RC is necessary to deter aggressors, reassure allies, and give leaders the forces they need. To do this, Mr. Ikle says, "We will [continue to] maintain as a reinforcement capability mobile active and reserve components in the United States."

The RC has about fifty percent of the Army's unit personnel strength, but considerably less than fifty percent of the Army's resources or attention. In a commentary in a recent edition of the *AUSA News*, Dick Kaufman noted that in spite of advances, the readiness of the RC is less than it should be. Equipment, training, MOS qualification, and more are lacking (much of it due to budget constraints). He says we cannot let the leadership just pass off reliance on the RC, "we need to emphasize the requirement for long term strategy discussion and implementation immediately."

In 1980, Melvin Laird referred to the strength, equipment, and training of the RC as "deplorable."⁵⁷ While it has improved, as we have seen, there is still more to be done.

To be viable, the Army must continue to completely integrate the RC into conventional strategic deterrence. "The modern National Guard is indeed a vital contributor to America's deterrent posture," according to the Director of the National Guard, LTG Herbert Temple. However, he says the Total Force requires a purely professional, adequately trained National Guard which is a full and vital partner in national defense.⁵⁸

Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger said the "... RC have to be an integral part of the Total Force, ... a blending of the professionalism of the full-time soldier with the professionalism of the citizen-soldier."⁵⁹ "Guard and Reserve forces which are not adequately equipped and which cannot be sustained in combat can ... contribute only marginally to either deterrence or the military power created and projected by preparedness."⁶⁰

According to the Congressional Budget Office's 1985 study, *Improving the Army Reserves*, the RC cannot handle the missions it has let alone any more. Most of their data came from Unit Status Reports, focusing on equipment, strength, and MOS qualification. CBO suggested some improvements: Equip early deploying units to ninety percent; Recruit experienced critically needed skilled people by reducing their training requirement to only the two-week Annual Training (no weekends) thereby drawing from a larger geographic area; Limit the growth of the RC; and Place top priority for everything to early deploying units.⁶¹

Manpower shortages always make us "look longingly" at the draft, William Brehm tells us in an article for the National Defense University. He warns that a return to the draft would not accomplish anything good for the AC, the RC, or the nation.¹¹ However, in the same text, Norman Friedman says the draft would be good for the Army because it would provide a pool of trained forces for a wartime "surge" and keep a good flow going into the RC.¹² After reviewing the first battles fought by the Army, John Shy warns us, "Without popular support, compulsory service is not likely to be effective."¹³

"The share of the DoD budget allocated to the RC has not kept pace with the growth in personnel strength and increased missions assigned to the National Guard and Reserve in recent years," according to the Reserve Forces Policy Board.¹⁴ BG Wendell Gilbert (USA, Ret.) says the Army spends too much time and money on "day to day readiness of the active force," and needs to concentrate more on the RC.¹⁵

The Congress

The Reserve Officers Association urged Congress throughout 1987 of the irrationality of "double dipping" the RC by transferring missions and units to them to save costs and then cutting the budgets of these same RC forces for further savings. "The threat has not diminished just because the U.S. has a serious budget deficit problem." The ROA states the RC stands ready, but only if they are adequately manned, trained, equipped, and funded.¹⁶

The Reserve Component

MG Will Hill Tankersley (USAR, Ret.), Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, warns us that more missions are coming to the RC, probably with fewer resources to accomplish them. He tells RC commanders to exercise more leadership and discipline because they would waste time complaining and trying to deal with the "big issues being discussed in the Pentagon and in the Congress." MG Tankersley says, "I believe that the war stoppers today are inadequate training, inefficient use of time, weak knees, fat bellies, feeble spirits, and poor morale." His "bottom line" is that the country needs to realistically accept the mission to do more with less, because all RC units and men will not be able to attain 100 percent of the training and readiness levels for which they are organized. These are strong words of realism from a man in a position to know reality.

CONCLUSION

While we must maintain our strategic nuclear deterrent capability against the possibility of strategic nuclear attack, we must also answer the call to provide a credible conventional deterrent capability against aggression in any other form. Given that strategic nuclear attack is least likely to occur, our attention is properly drawn to the requirement to deal effectively with all other contingencies.

Conventional strategic deterrence has returned to its proper position of importance, and with it a much greater reliance on the Army's RC than ever before. Congress and our defense leadership must do their part to secure the

most resources they can to make the conventional deterrence work for both the AC and the RC. Meanwhile, the RC leadership must do everything they can to make the most efficient use of the resources available.

The AC has a dual mission in this. In addition to their "forward deployed" role, they must continue to encourage the cooperation and integration with the RC which has been improving so much during the past few years.

The ultimate challenge for the Army's Reserve Components in the lean years ahead is to be the best partner in conventional deterrence they can be. The RC must have mobilization as their foremost thought and motivation. These are not weak charges, they are critical to the RC's role in the preservation of peace.

There is another somber note in all of this. In 1974, a group of researchers conducted a study of the value of deterrence from 125 B.C. to 1585 A.D.. While the findings of the study do not unequivocally support a conclusion that strong force causes, promotes, or precipitates war, they are conclusive enough to discredit the idea that a major power "which seeks peace lessens the likelihood of war by strengthening and improving its armed forces." Still, we have deterred major aggression for the past forty years.

Our motivation for continuing to use whatever means we have available to deter war is perhaps best summed up in the words of GEN John Piotrowski, CINC NORAD, "I know that war is a terrible thing, but I also believe it is not the most terrible thing. Certainly, the failure to defend the weak or the unopposed triumph of evil would be worse."

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